The World Bank/WBI’s CBNRM Initiative

Case Received: January 27, 1998

Author: E. Hachileka

Email: EHachileka@natsci.unza.zm

a)      Country:     Zambia,

b)      Province:     Eastern Province.

c)      District:     Mambwe District

d)      Area:          Lupande Game Management Area

e) Renewable natural resource:     Wildlife Resources

f) Important contextual factors:     Social, Economic and Conservation issues

g) The program:          Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRDP), now a community based wildlife resource management program.

h) Author involvement:     Was once employed in the LIRDP as A Research and Planning Officer in the area and has just completed a study on the effectiveness of benefit sharing schemes in community based wildlife resource management programs in Zambia.

The Government of the Republic of Zambia initiated the Luangwa integrated resource development project in 1987 with funding from Norwegian Government. The main object of the project was to improve the living standards of the people through sustainable use of the full range of both the human and natural resources of the area. However, going by the main activities of the project, it became evident that the project was preoccupied with wildlife conservation. As from 1994, the project officially narrowed its activities to wildlife conservation as a means to community development. Today, the primary objective of LIRDP is community based wildlife conservation while the secondary goal is to promote rural development using benefits derived from wildlife.

This has had important implications for the use of the wildlife revenues since the project is conservation rather than a development agency. It is important, therefore, that individuals in the communities get and associate direct incentives with wildlife, while the development of infrastructure should be a secondary goal coming as a result of community decisions.

Though this program was from the beginning designed to be community based, thus involving all the members of the community in wildlife conservation through planning, decision-making implementation and benefit sharing, the communities at large were not fully involved. Instead, the project adopted a top-down and paternalistic approach where they decided everything for the communities. As such the communities were not able to link the benefits of development projects which they themselves, did not plan.

This program was based on the premise that by involving communities in management, decision-making and benefit sharing from wildlife utilization, the communities would be encouraged to conserve wildlife. Unfortunately, with LIRDP, the communities at large were not involved in the management of the wildlife resources and so did not see the direct benefits of suffering the costs of living with wildlife.

The LIRDP management together with the traditional rulers decided for the communities what to do with the benefits received from wildlife utilization. Though monies were made available for community projects, the communities did not know how much was realized and did not link the developments funded to wildlife utilization. As such they did not get any incentives for them to realize the benefits of wildlife conservation. As a result, they did not see the need to protect the wildlife. There was generally a sense of mistrust for the traditional leadership and project management.

The communities, therefore, did not get any direct benefits from wildlife conservation yet they need cash to meet their daily needs while at the same time wildlife was raiding their crops in the fields.

Ultimately, the hypothesis, that in fact formed the basis of the program, was not realized and the envisaged wildlife conservation through community involvement was not being achieved.

The situation / problem had been going on from 1988 to 1995. The problem was very apparent to the Local communities, Project management and Annual Project Review Missions.

If the problem went unaddressed, the wildlife resources would be depleted through poaching and there would be no development in the area given the fact that legal wildlife utilization holds the greatest potential for the development of this area.

It became apparent that the project was not meeting its objective of reducing poaching and developing the area. The poaching statistics showed that the poaching was actually getting worse with time. The communities were increasingly becoming unsupportive of the project while the chiefs were getting less and less support from their subjects in continuing with the project.

Through meetings between the Project Management and Community Representatives, it was discovered that the communities were getting more and more disgruntled with the project as only a few people (Local Chiefs) were benefiting from the project and wildlife utilization.

The main actors in the reform process were the Project Management who recruited a Community Based Natural Resource Management Technical Director (CBNRM/TD) to improve the community participation in the programs of the project.

Through discussions between the Project Management through the CBNRM/TD, the Local Chiefs and Community Representatives, consensus was reached though with resistance from the Chiefs, that the organizational and institutional arrangements be changed to involve communities more actively.

A tour of a similar program in Zimbabwe (CAMPFIRE) was made by a team of Project staff, Chiefs and Community Representatives. From the tour the group learned a few things on community participation in a Community based wildlife conservation program. Meetings with all communities at village level were conducted upon return for discussion of the need to change the institutional arrangements of the program.

Working together as a group, the Project Management, Chiefs and the Community at large brought about the changes in institutional and organizational arrangements of the LIRDP.

A number of institutional developments have since taken place. These are:

• Village Action Groups

The communities have been divided into Village Action Groups (VAG) which are made up of several villages in each chiefdom. The VAG Committee is democratically elected for a two-year term. The Committees are representative and guided by community set objectives, procedures, principles and constitution. The role of the VAGs include:

• Identifying the immediate needs of the grouped villages through public meetings

• Communicating with the Area Development Committees on the needs of the communities

• Providing information to communities of the revenues realized and allocated to them

• They coordinate the decision-making on the expenditure of the community shares and supervise community projects identified by the village communities

• They disseminate awareness messages on the value of wildlife to communities and the need to support conservation

• They distribute cash dividends to the communities in the VAG.

In effect the VAGs have decentralized decision making and planning to the village level whereby communities are now directly involved in decision making.

The Area Development Committees were formed in each Chiefdom as a coordinating body of the activities of the VAGs. This is the next higher hierarchy in the organizational structure. The ADCs are made up of elected members from within the VAGs and are chaired by the area chief.

The ADCs are the ‘go-between’ between the Project management, Local Leaders Committee and the communities through the VAGs. They are the highest Chiefdom based institution for the implementation of project activities and benefit utilization. Their roles include:

• Receiving the revenue allocation for the Chiefdom

• Sharing of the money between VAGs and on –going community development projects

• Supervision of the activities of VAGs

• Overseeing community development programs in their areas

The central principles in both the VAG and ADC constitutions are that:

• They are owned by their members

• Every level is accountable to both the level above and below it.

• All activities are transparent and democratic.

This has brought about full devolution of wildlife management to the local communities.

The greatest benefit of the new approach is that people are now doing things for themselves, allowing community capacity and self-esteem to replace a crippling sense of helplessness and dependency. The approach has in particular provided the following benefits/improvements:

Wildlife generated direct benefits (cash dividends) to individual households. This has revolutionized attitudes towards wildlife in the area.

People choose for themselves what they want to do with the benefits received from wildlife. Member households may choose to allocate money as household cash or for community development projects or any way they wish. As such communities are transforming themselves to masters of their own destine and wildlife managers rather than helpless onlookers.

Development and establishment of transparent, democratic and accountable community based and community tailored institutions for management of wildlife generated revenues for the betterment of the community and the resource itself.

The financial empowerment of communities through the redesign of the revenue sharing mechanisms. The communities have fought for an increase in the funds allocated for the community activities. As such, now the communities retain 100 % of the revenue generated from the Game Management Areas.

The project management together with the communities has been responsible for administering these reforms which are in fact still on going.

Though the reform process is still going on, signs are beginning to show that the communities are beginning to change the attitudes towards wildlife through their realization of the direct benefits of wildlife. If these trends continue, the effect of this on the conservation efforts of the project should be apparent in the near future. This should be manifested by a reduction in poaching activities, increase in animal numbers and increase in the revenues realized by the communities from legal wildlife utilization.

The following lessons have been learned from this case:

• For a community to manage its resources sustainably, it must receive direct benefits arising from its use and these benefits must exceed the perceived costs of managing the resource and must be secure over time’.

• Any community based natural resource management program should in practice empower the involved communities to make decisions on the management of the resource.

• The communities should get and associate benefits derived to that particular resource as an incentive for them to support the program.

• The benefits to the communities must be appreciably adequate to empower the communities financially and enable them meet their daily needs at individual or household level.

• The communities must know the revenue generating mechanisms and those put in place for informing every member of the community on the benefits realized. Communities should be allowed to decide on their own what they would like to do with the benefits received

• For a community to manage its resource base in a sustainable manner, it must receive direct benefits arising from its use. These benefits must exceed the perceived costs of managing the resource and must be secure over time.

• These lessons should be applicable on most community based resource management programs.

• The role of traditional rulers in community based natural resource management need close examination otherwise it may hinder the devolution of power to democratically constituted institutions for representation of the community at large. The traditional rulers in this case have had too much power and influence on the activities of the projects in community participation. Under traditional norms and values, the subjects cannot question a chief’s decision. This may hinder full participation of all members of the community whose involvement may be the most critical for the success of any community based natural resource management program.