The Livestock and Pasture Development Project in Eastern Morocco is not simply innovative, but embraces elements that in many respects can be considered "revolutionary" in socio-economic development terms. It organises its activities around the formation of pastoralist cooperatives built on traditional ethnic lineages, promotes an array of hitherto unknown range management practices, and convinces herders, through adequate financial incentives, to sacrifice immediate economic gains for the sake of increasing the long-term productivity of their rangeland by reversing the trends of serious land degradation. At the same time, some of the project’s successful innovation have also turned out to be part of its problems, which call for reflection on possible long-tern course corrections.

The project’s overall objective is to raise the incomes and living conditions of some 9 000 pastoral families, while improving and sustaining the productivity of some 750 000 ha of grazing land. A supporting sub-objective is the formation of pastoralist cooperatives based on traditional group lineages. Specifically, the project intervenes in six areas: (i) pasture improvement, (ii) livestock development (animal health, genetic improvement), (iii) extension, training, research, (iv) credit for small herders, (v) women’s activities, and (vi) institutional strengthening. Total project costs: US$ 45.22 million, of which $ 14 million as IFAD loan, $ 6.43 million African Development Bank, $ 18.22 African Development Fund and $ 6.57 million Government contribution.

This project was evaluated in 1995, at Mid-Term, by the Office of Evaluation and Studies of IFAD. This evaluation was carried out under the responsibility of the author. The present case which is submitted in view of the International Workshop on Community-Based Natural Resource Management builds directly upon the evaluation work. It also draws on various presentations of this case in recent publications produced by IFAD, particularly by its Office of Evaluation and studies.

When the Moroccan Government received a plea for aid in 1986 from sheep herders in the country’s eastern region, the area was already withering from several consecutive years of drought. Flocks had been decimated, incomes had plummeted and debt was mounting. In these semi-arid steppes, where small-livestock-raising is the main activity, rangelands had been degraded and areas around water points had been overgrazed. The Minister of Agriculture at the time, Mr Demnati, told them that if they wanted support for their herding activities they would have to organise themselves. The responsible staff of the Ministry of Agriculture did a good job of helping the herders to understand that their individual strategies should be replaced by a collective approach.

Promising technical solutions to remedy the situation had been identified but were seldom in Morocco as well as in the whole Maghreb adopted by herders. Efforts to protect these people’s livelihood and environment had not been able to find a suitable delivery structure that took account of the complex social organisation of tribes, lineages and kinship groups.

The task of project designers was to define such a delivery structure in the provinces of Oujda and Figuig (since restructured administratively as three provinces: Oujda, Figuig and Jerada). In order to build the consensus needed for group discipline in the use of available rangelands, "ethnolineal" cooperatives were established on the basis of tribal structures and ancestral rights to rangeland use. This set up which gave a modern (i.e., democratic) and legally sanctioned existence to the traditional structure was meant to help herders to gradually become self-reliant.

The traditional ties linking large and small pastoralists had eroded somewhat since the 1960s as inequalities grew more apparent between the two groups. Several years of discussions and negotiations were necessary for these cooperatives, which meld old and new, to take form and decide on mutually agreed limits for their territories.

At first herders were a bit hesitant to adhere to the cooperatives, mainly because they had not grasped the underlying principles. Some were also fearing that they might lose control of their land in the process. Cooperatives membership began to grow after the project started up in July 1990; a series of meetings were held (by mid-term, over 1 000 social mobilisation sessions had been organised) and specific actions were carried out (rangeland protection) that yielded visible results from the very first year. Herders normally entitled to graze their flocks on these lands but who agreed not to for the two-year period during which the area was rested received collective compensation in the form of barley or concentrated feed (at an annual rate equivalent to 30 kg of barley per hectare). Although this represented only a fraction of the food supplements provided under the project (5% to 20%, depending on the case), it had a strong psychological impact on herders: the offer of compensation was proof that the government had acknowledged their right to these rangelands.

Having thus been "won over" by the project, herders now willingly pay a grazing fee during the three or four months following the opening of each new reserve. This attitude reflects a sea change from herders’ previous stance, since grass had traditionally been considered a "gift from God". Not infrequently rangeland protection activities were the subject of disputes. In the southern part of the project area (Bouarfa and Tendrara districts), the groups are very homogeneous and disputes were rare. Herders quickly accepted and enforced the new structure. In the northern part, the process advanced more slowly. Proposed reserves cut across areas used by different groups and this triggered some disputes. The government did not get involved though; herders were left to negotiate and find a solution on their own.

Since 1992, 34 cooperatives have been formed, with total membership estimated at 8 250 as of year-end 1997; they include virtually all the sedentary, semi-nomadic and nomadic herders in a vast region covering over three million hectares. The cooperatives rather quickly assumed an active role, notably in the management of the "land resting" exercise. With guidance from the project team, they have created reserves — over various two-year periods — covering a total of 450 000 hectares of one degraded margelands. Plant cover has been re-established. This measure produced important physical results with ecological and economic ramifications: as a result of a major recuperation of the vegetative cover, fodder production increased fivefold, from 150 kg/ha to 800 kg/ha of dry mass, the value of the latter exceeding the financial costs associated with the two year land resting by over 50%.

But the truly transcendental result of the land resting achievements lies in the behavioural change of the participating population. In a society, which has traditionally considered "l’herbe un don de Dieu" (grass as a gift of God), land withdrawal, animal carrying regulations and the levying of user fees constitute nothing less than a revolution of a centuries-old practice inherited from ancestors. These new disciplines were not only unanimously accepted, but also by and large respected — and this without expensive fencing of the rested land, which would not have been affordable on such a large scale of intervention.

All project targets related to pasture water supplies, a component particularly appreciated by the population, were met by mid-term, including the rehabilitation of some 50% of existing livestock water points, the construction of new water facilities and the provision of one water truck for each cooperative. At mid-point, some 85% of the livestock population of 929 000 sheep was covered by veterinary campaigns against major diseases and parasites.

The significance of these achievements must be seen against the background of failed past efforts to establish cooperatives, which tended to be regarded as an unwelcome form of State intervention. As the project started showing some initial results, many herders saw cooperatives as a way to increase their earnings, and that is what got them interested in strengthening these structures so they would be able to continue in place after project completion.

A perhaps less obvious result of the project is that it has created a new development dynamics in the region, which is also revealing new demands and posing new questions; this in itself, however intangible, should be considered a constructive project outcome.

Prominent among these questions are the issues related to the conditions for sustainability and to the apparent economic inequalities in the distribution of project benefits. Both are of course linked to existing traditional power structures which the project tends to reinforce. While the introduction of the cooperative concept has brought with it a good measure of modern management practices, representation and decision-making processes in the ethnic lineage cooperatives do not follow modern democratic principles, but traditional hierarchical structures, which makes for an uncertain long-term outlook for the neediest herders. Thus, the very concept that makes ethnic lineage cooperatives in the short run so attractive and successful for the project population at large is raising questions of its long-term viability.

In assessing conditions for sustainability, there is a need to reflect on possible future institutional adjustments and other ways of meeting the needs of the currently poorest 60% of the pastoralists. That reflection would also have to address the issue of changing the still considerable role of the State in cooperative management and working towards their greater autonomy.

Can the project be termed a success? Certainly the Ministry of Agriculture considers it as such. The project has been held up as a model of successful government action. Its accomplishments remain remarkable especially when compared with those of most of the projects carried out previously not only in Morocco but also elsewhere in the Region. The latter tackled land degradation and soil erosion from a technical standpoint; the human factor was lacking entirely.

What this project does is to bring in the human factor. Herders are included in the decision-making process from the very beginning. Its key feature is its innovation: the requirement that rangeland users organise as a precondition for support; the use of collective discipline — rather than fences — as the main way of ensuring that reserves are respected; and the cooperatives themselves, which represent a successful combination of a modern institutional framework — recognised by the government but not operative until then — and a social organisation rooted in the local setting but lacking vigour.

Four factors stand out among many in explaining the project’s success. Above all, there is the blending of modern and traditional concepts, which has an immediate attraction for the entire population. Secondly, the project embodied a well established rangeland and livestock development policy, a fact which allowed the herders to benefit from adequate financial incentives and a favourable legislative contexts. Thirdly, the project was conceived and implemented by a team of young, dynamic and motivated people, which managed successfully to promote that concept. And fourthly, the project succeeded to open an important channel of dialogue and interaction between public authorities and the project population; the absence of these has thwarted many valuable development initiatives in the past.

The importance of the proactive approach taken by the implementing agency cannot be overemphasized. The Provincial Office for Agriculture in Figuig and the project office in Jerada took a very active role in negotiations with the herders. They made a concerted effort to bring the parties together, build consensus and raise awareness. No matter how well designed and planned a project may be, if the team charged with carrying it out is not dynamic enough, the project can fail miserably. Here, we have seen a team that is high-performing, motivated and very active

The project has produced important lessons to guide replication efforts in Morocco and elsewhere. Factors which seem to determine the degree of replicability include in particular:

• A high level of consistency between the project concept and its policy and institutional context.

• Ability on the part of politicians and project planners to recognise the opportunities for innovation offered by traditional institutions, to understand their limitations and to have the vision of turning both limitations and opportunities into advantage in support of positive change.

• In complex situations marked by entrenched social and cultural custom and structures as in the Moroccan case, the human-resource factor in project design and management — in terms of dynamic and motivated people with a sense of vision — is of paramount importance.