The case illustrates how national political reforms in Mali, with introduction of multiparty system, rapidly changed local political structures and village regimes related to management of common-pool rangeland and crop land. Two village cases are presented to illustrate the diversity in village responses to broadly similar external circumstances. Different responses reflect a diversity in social history and capacity of the local elites in meeting new demands arising from multiparty reforms, and different degree of dependence on the state in village conflict resolution. In one village (Kakagnan; 2000 people) the elite was able to re-organise, meet new demand from active social groups and establish a robust and more democratic resource regime. In another village (Dialloubé; 4000 people), the old Chief and authority structure was challenged by wealthy traders and cash crop entrepreneurs, who used new political parties as leverage mechanism in political bargaining for access to land. The elite group was not able re-establish a stable and robust resource regime. The result was a rapid rush for rice land and decline in floodplain rangeland resources.

The case is based on research conducted over a four years period among agro-pastoral Fulani communities of the Inland Niger Delta. The researcher spent about six months in the field, while additional field-work was carried out by Malian assistants and researchers.

The case explores changes in management regimes of two Fulani villages, whose noble elites control some of the largest remaining flood-plain pastures of the Inland Niger Delta (and West Africa). They are of critical importance for the local and the national (livestock) economy. There are global conservation interests attached to the management of the floodplains, which also serves as breeding ground for important fisheries.

The resource base of the Delta is complex (delta ecology) and highly variable in relation to pasture and crop production. The local actors are pastoralists, agro-pastoralists, cultivators, and cattle-rich traders of diverse ethnic and social status positions ("castes"). There are also external investors in local resources (absentee herd owners and cash crop entrepreneurs). The rules and regimes involved in resource management are basically embodied in Village Chiefs, Councils and local elites interacting with state officials at local and national level. Local political processes evolve without much influence of the World Bank supported Mopti Area Development Project, which covers the area (aimed at improving livestock development, irrigated rice cultivation, and crop-livestock integration.)

Historically, the village commons were set aside for livestock grazing in the 1820 (with reference to Islamic law) in a way perceived legitimate (although not "fair" in relation to sub-ordinate cultivating slaves, in whose interests it would be to cultivate the rangeland commons). In the immediate post-independence "socialist" period , ex-slaves and non-noble cultivators received a certain support for land claims against "feudal" Fulani noble elites by central state authorities (under President Keita). Following the more authoritarian Moussa Traoré-regime from 1968 and the one-Party system of UDPM (from 1979), local Fulani elites were able to re-establish a more total hegemony at local level. They suppressed land claims of ex-slaves through control of all channels of voicing local concerns outside the village (political, administrative, customary). Political or economic organisation at local level was forbidden by law, except within state-supported programmes (e.g. Herders Co-operatives, women groups, agricultural co-operatives). The key officials of the Village Council, all members of the Party, placed an efficient lid on any local movements and attempts to organise interests along professional and economic interests. The village regimes were governed in an authoritarian way by use of military police which was requested and obtained from the local state officials (through close personal or political alliances and bribes). Both internal and external groups, with rights to local resources, could be the subject of coercive acts in which fining for "illegal" grazing or use of resources was a commonly used tactic. A narrow group around the Chiefs controlled the common pool resources of the village. This resulted in suppression of less influential groups, increasing conflict and tension between demand and supply of land. The regimes were inefficient in the sense that entrepreneurs with goals of developing crop land or increase use of pastures would not always have access. The regime was managed in the interest of the narrow elite, who would have direct personal benefits in various ways, rather than in the interest of broader groups.

Change came at local level with the coup d'état in 1991. The fall of the one-Party regime spurred local groups to organise themselves in new political groups and demand a change in the authoritarian Village Councils and village regimes.

In Kakagnan, the young noble men of the village were especially active and managed to gain higher representation in the Village Council and the Surveillance Committee for the village common (inspired by the student movement in the capital). An educated local elite decided to give concessions to the young men and opposition leaders of different political parties. A new stable and more legitimate resource regime ensured that individual crop land expansion was done in an orderly and legitimate way. Important floodplain pastures remained protected. Here cultivators and ex-slaves conform to the old order and respect the village authority structure (for good and for bad).

In Dialloubé, the Village Council and resource regime became destabilised. Pastures were converted to crop land rapidly through a disordered, chaotic and rapid "rush" for flooded crop land by groups of traders and ex-slaves - even in zones the Village Council had decided to conserve as common pasture. Following the creation of multi-party system at local level (after 1991), wealthy local traders sought political alliances in tenure disputes with cultivating ex-slaves. The two groups established contacts with political party groups in Bamako and the regional capital (Governor of Mopti) to enhance local bargaining stands. They challenged the Chief and destabilised the old authority structure. The Chief and the Council had lost credibility over the years because of too intimate reliance on support from the local state officials and the Party for power and influence in management. The Chief was not able to re-orient himself to a new political situation and gain support for his authority system "from below" (when the Party structure fell). In this village, there were no young men active in political bargaining, reflecting that the pastoral elite groups have low education, weak exposure to urban values, and weak organisational tradition. They were outmanoeuvred in politics by better organised, educated, and compact elite groups among noble Fulani traders. The traders are both wealthy and interested in cash crop investment.

Other important organisational and political changes also started spontaneously in the early 1990s, partly as a consequence of new political relationships. Such changes included for example organised demand for territorial and tenure rights over village commons and strengthening of access-control mechanisms; establishment of a pastoral association in Kakagnan (with no external support); establishment of a new organisation for promoting the interests of the Fulani (Amis de Peul); new political organisations and forms of joint actions in relation to resource management. Local politicians now often challenge ambiguous intervention by state officials or Chiefs.

The uncontrolled transformation of the resource-system has negative impacts on pastures, conservation, and international biodiversity concerns. It also has potential negative impacts on fisheries, which are being overexploited mainly for other reasons. Degradation also occur, when new rice fields are cleared instead of infested rice fields being weeded, or on individually held dryland crop fields when no manure is used and the soil become depleted.

There are many lessons from the cases. First of all, organisational change and property regimes at village level are significantly conditioned by national level politics. The state does through different capacities and strategies influence local regimes regarding who decides what over whom; who benefits; and how resources are managed. Secondly, despite the state being important in property rights enforcement, institutional change must be understood as site-specific phenomenon, as an interactional process between local and central actors and forces. Village politics matters (Vedeld 1997). Thirdly, the observations show that local resource regimes are dynamic in response to increasing pressure and demand for crop land. But regimes react differently to reforms and pressures. Different villages and groups have different capacities for organisation, while capacity to organise and articulate joint claims become crucial in a multiparty context. Clearly agro-pastoral communities do not necessarily protect key pastoral rangeland resources, when they are extremely food insecure. This brings up a fourth lesson. Since a constant tension exists between demand for change in the "formal" rules (reflecting demand for access to more crop land) and persistent "informal" rules (reflecting demand for conservation of pastures and "old" order), the supply dimension of property rights and the role of village leadership become crucial. To this end, common-pool rangeland management become a function of who controls access; people with basically pastoral or crop cultivation interests. Often the elites in control do not take broader societal concerns into consideration. Hence, co-management remains important for resolving social dilemmas and environmental management concerns with broader implications.

Regarding development assistance, it becomes important to work towards institutional capacity building at both national and local level - with a particular focus on leadership training. Capacity building should focus on resource planning and conflict management with the aim of creating enabling institutional arrangements at various levels and for various purposes.

Vedeld, Trond 1997: Village politics, heterogeneity, leadership, and collective action among Fulani of Mali, doctor scientiarum thesis 1997:13, Agricultural University of Norway, As