Since democratisation started in Mali in 1991, the authorities have been planning and implementing a desentralisation reform. Through the presentation of two case studies, the paper discusses impacts of the reform on community-based natural resource management. The first case study is from the cotton zone in southern Mali, the second is from Dogonland in the central parts of the country. The data come from regular visits to Mali for research and consultancies since 1987.

The Forest Policy which was enforced in Mali before the political change in 1991 was a direct result of the forest décret of 1935. This law claimed State ownership of all land which was considered «empty» and without an owner. The only way to establish legal ownership of the land was through productive use (mise en valeur), which in practical terms would mean farming. Thus, pastoralism, the collection of wood and gathering of wild grains, fruits and medicinal plants fall outside the notion of property which was used. The result was that large areas of fallow land and silvo-pastoral land was annexed by the State. This led to an antagonism between customary rules and regulations and the regulations and laws issued by the authorities. Customary communal use rights were regarded as being inconsistent with rational forest management and were restricted or suspended. The resulting forest policy was primarily concerned with conservation. It was generally assumed that local Malian populations were causing degradation through a general overuse of the resource base. Therefore, a system of permits for use and fines for rule violation was created.

The 1935 forest law was revised twice in Mali; in 1968 only with minor modifications, and in 1986. The former president Moussa Traoré was a concerned «environmentalist». To impress donors, the revised forest law of 1986 was made even more severe with extremely high fines compared to the income level in Mali. The new forest law completely banned all bush fires and made wood saving stoves compulsory.

Because of the policy of harassment and the lack of dialogue with the local communities, there has been a general antagonism between the Forest Service and the rural people throughout Mali. However, after the democratisation process commenced in March 1991, the authorities have tried to attenuate this antagonism.

In March 1991, former president Moussa Traoré was overthrown through demonstrations and popular unrest which culminated in a coup d'etat. A transitional government was established and the process of democratisation started. Then, during spring 1992, presidential and legislative elections were organised and the new government headed by President Alpha Oumar Konaré was inaugurated.

After March 1991, criticism against the centralised State and its abuse of power and calls for decentralisation was frequently heard. Both the transitional government and the governments since have been committed to decentralisation.

Many of the implications of the decentralisation policy regarding land tenure, natural resource management and the redefinition of the role of the State are influenced by the policies of the major donors in Mali. Without doubt the donors have used the occasion to encourage the Malian government to undertake a major reorganisation. In fact, these changes are not only encouraged, but may sometimes also be imposed by foreign aid.

In the field of natural resources management, donor policies encouraging decentralisation are based on the gestion de terroir approach which has become popular in project planning in the Sahel. Gestion de terroir refers to the actual management by the rural population of its terroir (village land). The main aim of the terroir approach is improved environmental management by giving villagers more responsibility in the management of village land (fallows, forests and pastures). The approach may be seen as a consequence of international donors’ concern for environmental degradation during the 1980’s.

The new decentralisation law, which gives the general framework for decentralisation in Mali, points toward some kind of co-management between the State and local communities. However, in this law and other recent laws pertinent to the decentralisation reform, it still remains unclear what the role of the local communities vis-a-vis the State, and the Forest Service in particular, will be. There appears to be some room for manoeuvre here, and a lot will depend on the negotiation power of individual local institutions.

On some points, the new forest law of 1995, implies a more liberal policy. There is no mentioning of wood saving stoves being compulsory, bush fires are allowed under certain conditions, local people have explicit use rights to dead wood for fuel, and only fallows older than 10 years are defined as forest (earlier it was 5 years). However, fines are still high for the cutting of green wood without a permit from the Forest Service, and 11 species are now protected against 10 in the 1986-law. Several of these species are found on agricultural land and are traditionnally protected by peasants because of being beneficial to crops (i.e. Acacia albida) or for the economic importance of their fruits (i.e. the sheanut tree (Butyrospermum paradoxum) and the néré (Parkia biglobosa)). These trees can only be cut upon a special authorisation from the Forest Service. The law does not, however, mention pruning of farm trees, which is important for farmers, but currently the policy is to allow it.

According to the decentralisation reform, each Commune elects its Council headed by a Mayor who is responsible for the administration of the area. Regarding environmental management, the State is only represented by a technical advisor in the Commune. However, this technical advisor is employed by the government and not by the Commune, and it appears that his role will be to control permits to use and sanctions for misuse of natural resources, in addition to giving technical advise. However, some land in the Communes belong to the Communes and some to the State, and it is not clear whether the function of the technical advisor will differ on the two types of land.

Following the introduction of the terroir approach and the plans for decentralisation, a number of donor funded projects and programmes have been established with the aim of improving environmental management while building on local or customary institutions. If allowing to succeed, such initiatives will imply a new forest policy in Mali based on co-management. Two such initiatives are here briefly presented.

In southern Mali, there are several attempts by donor funded programmes as well as by local communities to establish formal agreements regulating natural resource access in village terroirs. One such experience is the Siwaa project. In 1988, some villages close to Koutiala town complained that they were not able to fully benefit from improved soil management on their village terroirs. Outsiders, basically wood traders from the town, were exploiting these terroirs. The villagers were not able to exclude the wood traders because of the old Forest law. The erosion control programme of the cotton company (CMDT) together with a Dutch funded research group then proposed the establishment of a terroir test project. The Siwaa committee is now a formalised co-operation between six villages. Each village has three representatives in the committee. However, the sharing of resources through formal co-operation between villages is a new idea in Mali and it was not estabished in the Siwaa case without internal conflict. It appeared that five of the six villages had fuelwood scarcity, while the sixth, M’Péresso, had a surplus on its terroir. All the villages experienced problems with woodcutters from Koutiala town. However, M’Péresso people had the impression that the other five villages wanted to use the convention to get formal access to their terroir. The other villages for example suggested that M’Péresso only should sell wood in the Siwaa zone, and not in Koutiala. In view of the higher prices in Koutiala, this was not acceptable to M’Péresso, but also they had an interest in a local convention, because it was made clear by the Forest Service in the Sikasso region that an enclosure of its terroir alone would not be accepted.

In 1993, the Siwaa committee started to work out a common convention and in March 1995 it was approved by all the villages. The agreement was then presented to the local Forest Service for their approval. Similar agreements from the other terroir programmes mentioned above have also been submitted to the Forest Service. Also a number of individual villages without external support have taken such initiatives by themselves. These attempts at converting open access areas into local commons was, in 1995, stopped by the Forest Service. Their argument was that they could not approve any conventions before the implementation of the decentralisation reform. The follow-up now depends on the local elections in 1998 and not the least on the strength and negotiation power of the village institutions involved.

The ogokana is an old village institution among the Dogon people responsible for natural resources management. The word ogokana comes from ogo (power) and kannu (punishment). Hence, it is an institution with the mandate of enforcing local rules through sanctions. The scope of the traditional ogokana goes, however, beyond mere natural resources management. Its purpose is to maintain order, peace and mutual understanding in the village through management of the village land and resolution of social conflicts.

The application of the old law, through the Forest Service weakened the role of customary institutions in environmental management. After 1991, local and customary institutions have, however, resurfaced as potential important actors in natural resources management. In the Koro District (Cercle) in central Mali, there has been a spectacular reviving of the ogokanas since 1991. This process has been facilitated by CARE, an international NGO intervening in the area.

In 1984, CARE started an agro-forestry project in the Koro District. As the project developed, CARE experienced that there was a certain capacity, competence and knowledge relating to agro-forestry among local people in the Koro-area and that the constraint in this field was rather the forest policy practiced at the time. While people earlier had used to protect seedlings of Acacia albida and other species on their fields, the forest policy, at least during the 1970's and 80´s, had put and end to this. Even though the old forest law allowed pruning of trees on one´s own fields, the policy practiced by the foresters included fining people who did this, which led people not to protect the seedlings. This was identified as a major obstacle to natural regeneration in the fields. CARE then, in 1990, managed to convince the Forest Service to accept that farmers use their farm trees. The decision considerably increased the participation of farmers in the project activities. Then, in 1992, two conventions were established in the Koro-area between the Forest Service and the ogokanas of two villages with CARE as a facilitator giving responsibility for natural resource management to the ogokanas.

However, in 1993, the two above-mentioned conventions were cancelled by the Forest Service. According to the conventions, the two ogokanas could collect fines after infraction of the rules established, but it seems that in practice, only small such fines had been collected. However, the Forest Service soon regretted the conventions and especially the mandate given to the ogokanas of giving fines. This was perceived as threatening one of its major sources of revenue. In addition, a study carried out for CARE in 1993 questioned the legality of the conventions, because the ogokana appears not to be a legal entity which can enter into a legally binding contract. According to the law, in order for an ogokana to be a party in a convention, it should first be officially recognised and registered. Because of these two problems, CARE decided to suspend the support of the officialisation process of the ogokanas. It was also concluded that the decentralisation process would solve this problem, because village authorities would play important roles in the management of the forthcoming Communes. The cancelling of the conventions and the lack of officialisation of the ogokana do not, however, seem to impact a lot on their activities. They continue to thrive and to manage village land with or without a convention. But having one is an advantage to the villagers, because of it being an assurance against strangers with permis de coupe (permits to cut trees which can be bought from the Forest Service).

The decentralisation experience from Mali so far shows that devolving decision making to the community level also means threathening the power and position of some local and central administrators, who will fight against such change. Regarding natural resource management, the success of the decentralisation reform will therefore depend on the role played by local communities. In cases with strong and active local institutions, there is a good potential and possibility for co-management. However, where these institutions remain weak or not involved for some reason, local administrators will benefit and top-down State management will continue.