The World Bank/WBI’s CBNRM Initiative

Case Received: January 30, 1998

Author: David R. Yanggen

Tel: +51 64 578704

Fax: +51 64 579078

E-mail: dyanggen@cgnet.com

In response to rapid natural resource degradation, inhabitants of 6 villages in southeast Mali created in 1989 an institutional structure for improved watershed management known as the "Zone Siwaa" (ZS). The two principal functions of the ZS are (1) the regulation of natural resource exploitation to ensure sustainable levels of use and (2) the undertaking of community level natural resource conservation projects.

I worked for two years with the Zone Siwaa as a Peace Corps-CMDT agricultural extension agent living in Kaniko one of the ZS villages. I supported the ZS initiative by working with farmers to install a variety of agroforestry techniques in their fields and gardens. The agroforestry techniques prevent natural resource degradation by reducing erosion, recycling nutrients and fixing nitrogen, and providing a renewable source of fodder, wood, and other tree products. I subsequently worked for 3 ½ years for the productivity and natural resource management component of USAID’s Food Security II Project as a research assistant. I conducted research into the Zone Siwaa and other similar community-based natural resource management initiatives.

The population of the Zone’s six villages is 6,300 people. The total area is 16,000 hectares. The inhabitants are of the Minianka ethnic group and consist of a mix of Muslims, Animists, and Christians. The ZS is in close proximity to the town of Koutiala with a population of approximately 40,000 inhabitants.

The Zone Siwaa is in the Soudanian climatic zone and receives an average of approximately 800mm of rainfall a year. It has been experiencing the effects of a cyclical drought since the mid 1960’s which has lowered the average precipitation by approximately 100mm a year. There are two principal seasons: rainy and dry. The rainy season lasts approximately 4 ½ months from late May to early October. Rains are erratic and often violent resulting in severe erosion.

The principal food crops are millet, sorghum, maize, and peanuts. Cotton is the main cash crop and predominant source of farmer revenue. Cotton production combined with the introduction of animal traction has led to extensification of agricultural production. Most arable land is now being cultivated and some marginally productive and increasingly ecologically fragile lands are being brought into production. Further, cotton profit reinvestment into livestock has greatly increased herd sizes.

The Compagnie Malienne du Developpement du Textile (CMDT) is the dominant development entity in the region. It is a semi-autonomous parastatal organization in charge of cotton production in the zone. It is a vertically integrated operation with a monopoly on the commercialization of cotton output and production inputs. It provides farmers with a wide array of agricultural extension services and certain social services.

Village governance is dominated by the traditional village chief and counsel of elders and the Association Villageois (AV). The AV is in charge of marketing the village’s cotton. It extracts a tax from cotton sales used for village infrastructure projects (health, education, roads etc.…). In practice, there is often a large overlap in membership between traditional village governance and the AV.

Natural resource degradation was having a direct impact on villagers’ livelihood. Migration out of the village was occurring due to farmers’ inability to produce enough food on degraded farmland. Livestock mortality was increasing during the long dry season as forest and pasture vegetation no longer provided adequate fodder supplies. Furthermore, sick and emaciated draft animals were having difficulties plowing fields at the beginning of the rainy season during the critically short planting period. Finally, women were spending more time walking greater distances to find increasingly scarce wood for cooking and other household needs. In sum, key natural resources essential for subsistence were becoming critically scarce.

The initial impetus for institutional change came about at the initiative of inhabitants of the villages of Kaniko and Try. They felt that anti-erosion efforts undertaken since 1984 were being undermined by outsiders exploiting natural resources in their watershed. In particular, firewood and charcoal merchants from Koutiala were harvesting cartloads of wood to sell in Koutiala and others were cutting foliage from trees and shrubs to sell as fodder. In addition, they mentioned the grazing of large cattle herds on their watershed’s pasture areas. These herds were mainly owned by rich merchants from Koutiala. To a lesser extent, herders of the Peuhl ethnic group practicing nomadic livestock raising were also passing through the zone.

The dilemma faced by residents of the villages near Koutiala was that legally they were not able to control outsider harvesting of their watershed’s forest and pasture resources. Pastures were under an open access regime and the Water and Forest Department controlled the granting of wood collection permits to outsiders. They therefore brought their concerns to the CMDT’s Division of Soil Protection and Restoration (DDRS).

Two institutions were created: an Intervillage Siwaa Committee and a Technical Group. The Intervillage Siwaa Committee is composed of three representatives including a woman from each village plus each village’s chief and AV president. The Technical Group is composed of the principal government organizations operating in the zone: the CMDT (represented by PROFED, a service focused on supporting women, and the DDRS), the Water and Forest Department, the Livestock Service, and the ESPGRN, a government research institute focusing on natural resource management.

The Intervillage Siwaa Committee’s responsibilities are to regulate the use of natural resources by village residents and to organize community-level natural resource conservation projects. The Technical Group was formed to help the Zone’s residents control outsiders’ use of their watershed resources and to provide residents with technical support for their conservation efforts.

The Water and Forest Service agreed to stop issuing wood cutting permits for the Zone Siwaa and granted residents the authority to confiscate wood and force wood cutters to leave the zone. The Livestock Service contacted Koutiala-based herders and encouraged them to stop grazing their animals in the Zone Siwaa.

The Intervillage Committee also took a series a measures. These included: limiting the harvesting of wood to 3 cartloads per woman per year, prohibiting the sale of wood and charcoal in Koutiala, organizing the women to build and use fuel-efficient mud stoves, and encouraging market gardeners to reuse garden stakes for at least two years. In addition, a rotating system of communal pasture use and community-based construction of anti-erosion rock lines were also proposed.

The outcome of these changes is difficult to quantify. However, aerial photos of the Zone Siwaa before and several years after these institutional changes showed a degree of natural resource recuperation (Jansen et Diarra, 1992). Also, farmers in the Zone noted a decrease in outsiders harvesting wood and pasturing animals.

Nevertheless, these initiatives have encountered a large number of problems. First, villager authority to regulate outsider exploitation of their resources was never formally established. The Water and Forest Department gave verbal authority to ZS residents to stop wood cutting. However, many of the wood carters refuse to accept residents’ authority. Many tense confrontations have taken place in which the residents often backed down for fear of physical violence. ZS residents asked for formal authority in the form of a policing license from the Water and Forest Department but were refused. Similarly, Koutiala herders had simply been encouraged to avoid the Zone. Residents have no authority to force them to leave. Nomadic Peuhl herders for their part are simply unaware of the Zone’s existence and continued to come as before.

Another problem concerns women’s use of forest resources. Many women from the Zone are dependent on income from wood sales for many of their basic needs. These women often do not respect the sale and quantity restrictions set by the Intervillage Siwaa Committee. A fine of 1000 CFA was established but is not enforced due to the lack of a formal policing authority. The residents themselves typically feel uncomfortable enforcing fines because of social ties to the individuals involved. A high rate of construction of improved mud stoves has been achieved in the Zone. In those cases of non-compliance, once again fines are typically not imposed for social reasons.

Pasture regeneration via a system of rotating use has not been adopted. Farmers expressed doubts concerning the ability to limit access to pastures. Also there was some disagreement in terms of which pastures should be allowed to rest first.

Community-based implementation of rock lines also met with limited success. Generally one section of a village’s watershed is chosen to install the lines. Individuals may wait years before efforts reach their fields thus discouraging participation. Also, the work is generally agreed to by the household head but carried out by the household’s younger men. These younger men may have other priorities such as market gardens, urban wage jobs, or petty commerce where the personal benefits are more direct.

While the specifics of the Zone Siwaa case may differ from other similar local community-based natural resource management initiatives, four broad themes emerge which have general applicability. These include: consideration of the regional and national context, the dependence of individuals on (over) exploitation of natural resources for immediate survival needs, the need for adequate enforcement mechanisms, and the recognition of other social and economic priorities.

Often it is assumed that purely local solutions can be found to local natural resource problems. Many of the Zone Siwaa’s problems were coming from Koutiala outside the Zone. Most of Koutiala’s 40,000 residents are also extremely poor. They currently have no alternatives to charcoal and firewood from the surrounding areas’ forests to meet their energy needs. Restricting access to the Zone Siwaa’s fuelwood resources at best forces the overexploitation of other nearby zones. Policies at the national level to promote alternative sources of energy such as natural gas or solar energy are one possible solution. Promotion of commercial wood plantations at the regional level is another. In sum, local communities are becoming increasingly integrated into and affected by a broader regional, national, and indeed international context. Purely local solutions may not be entirely effective without a rational coordinated strategy at higher levels.

Monitoring and enforcement capacities were clearly inadequate in the Zone Siwaa case. Residents of the Zone did not possess a recognized authority to keep outsiders from exploiting their watershed resources. Nor was there a formal internal policing system. Individual residents were generally unwilling to enforce Siwaa regulations due to social ties with local offenders. Mechanisms of monitoring and enforcement are a clear prerequisite for success of these types of initiatives.

Lastly, there is often an assumption that if conservation practices are technically effective they will necessarily be adopted. Village residents, however, have a wide range of needs and only limited labor and capital resources. The building of a school or health clinic for example may take priority over conservation efforts. Also, many conservation efforts require labor and capital investments in the current period but only give payoffs in the medium or long term. Individuals living in extreme poverty often put emphasis on other activities with a more immediate payoff (e.g., market gardens, petty commerce, etc.…). One potential solution is to emphasize techniques such as agroforestry which both fights natural resource degradation and provides short-term marketable products.

Jansen L., and Diarra S. 1992. Mali-Sud, Etude Diachronique des Surfaces Agricoles. Quantification des Superficies Agricoles et la Dégradation pour Quatre Terroirs Villageois entre 1952 et 1987. Version Révisée. DRSPR, Sikasso/Université Agronomique, Wageningen/KIT, Amsterdam

Joldersma, R. and S. Diarra. 1992. Outil Conseil Gestion de Terroir Villageois. Document Présenté au Séminaire dur le Bilan et les Perspctives de la Recherche-Systeme au Mali, Sikasso 17-21 November 1992. DRSPR, Sikasso Mali.

Touré, D., E. Dembele, and R. Bosma. 1991. Proposition d’Actions Concretes d’Elevage dans la Zone Siwaa. PLAE, Koutiala Mali.

Van der Pol, F. 1992. Soil Mining. An Unseen Contributor to Farm Income in Southern Mali. KIT, Amsterdam.